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POLITICS AND THE COURTS:
A POSITIVE THEORY OF JUDICIAL
DOCTRINE AND THE RULE
OF LAW
MCNOLLGAST*
It is often in the doctrinal realm that the Justices shape the
political role of the Supreme Court. Even assuming that the Court
is always highly interested in which party [to the case] wins, the flex-
ibility of legal techniques is usually sufficient for the Justices to
choose among several doctrinal alternatives. The doctrinal and
therefore political content of most opinions is only tenuously re-
lated to which party won the case.'
In truth the Supreme Court has seldom, if ever, flatly and for
very long resisted a really unmistakable wave of public sentiment.2
The influence of politics on the judiciary has long been acknowl-
edged. Perhaps the most famous example is the "switch in time to
save nine," whereby Supreme Court Justice Roberts reversed his op-
position to the New Deal after the 1936 elections. Franklin
Roosevelt's personal landslide, two-thirds majorities in both the
House and Senate and control of nearly three fourths of the state leg-
islatures, provided an opportunity to revise the constitutional inter-
pretations contained in offending Court decisions and gave credibility
to Roosevelt's ultimately unsuccessful threat to expand the size of the
Supreme Court in order to appoint a majority of Justices that would
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support his policies.3 A more distant but equally profound example
took place during and immediately after the Civil War. Abraham Lin-
coln's ability to influence the judiciary was enhanced by the creation
of a Tenth Circuit (and the creation of a tenth seat on the Supreme
Court which was eliminated when Justice Taney, the author of Dred
Scott,4 left the Court). The wave of appointments by Lincoln and later
Ulysses Grant solidified Republican policies regarding Recon-
struction.
The purpose of this Article is to extend a large, impressive body
of scholarship about political influences on the courts by developing a
theory of exactly how and under what conditions politics affects judi-
cial doctrine. With a few exceptions, the literature about the politics
of the judiciary links changes in doctrine to specific political events
such as path-breaking court decisions, a rash of new Supreme Court
appointments, or changes in judicial jurisdiction, powers, or resources
that follow an electoral realignment. Expanding on these considera-
tions, we seek to specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
distinct and sudden reversal in judicial doctrine.
We are motivated by the observation that not all intermittent
changes in the composition of the elected branches are followed by
significant changes in judicial doctrine, even when the new political
regime seeks such changes. A recent, obvious example is Ronald
Reagan's election in 1980. Although Reagan made Supreme Court
doctrine on abortion, civil rights, school prayer, criminal justice, and
states' rights major themes of his campaign for the presidency in 1980,
and although his fellow Republicans controlled the Senate (and,
hence, the judicial appointment process) during the first six years of
his administration, most observers agree that the Reagan-era Court
did not succeed in dramatically changing doctrine.5 Our theory ad-
dresses the question of why Reagan failed while Roosevelt succeeded.
To attack this problem, we deploy the logic of sequential decision
theory to the complex system of interactions among the Supreme
Court, lower courts (both federal and state), and the elected branches.
Our approach focuses on the competition and conflict that arise be-
tween higher and lower courts, and between the courts and the
3. Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional
Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Supreme Court Packing Plan, 12 INr'L REv. L. & EcoN. 45
(1992).
4. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
5. E.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, AVE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
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elected branches,6 in contrast to the cooperative or "team" aspects of
the judicial system.7  The primary difference between these ap-
proaches is that the former focuses on the resolution of policy differ-
ences among courts while the latter focuses on efficient ways for a
group of courts to achieve a common objective. We believe that both
types of problems arise in the judicial system; thus, both literatures
can generate important insights about the evolution of jurisprudence
and judicial doctrine.
We focus on the strategic decisions of a Supreme Court that
wants either to establish new doctrine (for example, the Warren
Court), or to defend established doctrine against an ill political wind
(for example, the Court during Roosevelt's first term) in the face of
possible resistance from either lower courts, the elected branches, or
both. In achieving its policy objectives, the Court faces two problems:
first, how to induce lower courts to adhere more or less faithfully to its
doctrine (the Supreme Court's agency problem with lower courts in
the hierarchy); and second, how to avoid reversals or other punish-
ments by the political branches (the Supreme Court's problem of
avoiding being regarded as a noncomplying agent by the political
branches).
The instigating event in our drama is the creation of a disjuncture
between the preferred policies of the Supreme Court and either the
lower courts or the elected branches. Such an event can be caused by
either a major electoral change, such as a partisan realignment, or a
change in the dominant views on the Court. The latter can occur due
to "stealth" appointments of Justices who have undetected idiosyn-
cratic policy preferences, the emergence of a new but highly important
legal issue that was not anticipated in picking the members of the cur-
rent Court, or as is often believed, even a brilliant new insight emanat-
ing from academic lawyers.8 The key point is that the Court, the
elected branches, and the lower courts often significantly differ in
6. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LA v &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 65 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7
Game, 80 GEo. L.J. 523 (1992); Charles Cameron, New Avenues for Modeling Judicial Politics
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
7. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Supreme Court Precedent, 46
STAN. L. REv. 817 (1994); Lewis A. Komhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team:
Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1605 (1995).
8. See, for example, Laurence Tribe's discussion of issues not anticipated at the time of
appointment and Bruce Ackerman's discussion of the importance of brilliant legal theorists in
guiding the Court in new directions. LAURENCE H. TRiBE, GOD SAVE Tins HONORABLE COURT
(1985); Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1164 (1988).
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their preferences concerning judicial doctrine. The puzzle is how
these differences will be resolved: Under what conditions will the
Court impose its preferences, and when will it bend to the will of
those with whom it disagrees?
In deciphering this puzzle, one of our more surprising results con-
cerns the relationship between the Supreme Court and the lower
courts. Although manipulation of Supreme Court decisions via ex-
pansion and replacements has long been understood in the legal and
political science literatures, few scholars have studied how politically
induced expansion and changes in the distribution of lower court ju-
rists can affect the doctrinal decisions of the Supreme Court. We show
that, under the appropriate circumstances, expansion of the lower ju-
diciary can have the same effect on judicial doctrine as packing the
Supreme Court.
An important component of our theory is an explanation of how
the Supreme Court induces lower courts to adhere to its choice of
doctrine. When the Supreme Court's resources are extensive and
most lower courts do not disagree substantially with the Court, the
Court can enforce a doctrine that focuses narrowly on its preferred
interpretation. In contrast, when most lower courts differ substan-
tially from the preferred doctrine of the Supreme Court, the problem
of noncompliance becomes important. Our theory suggests that the
Supreme Court will expand the range of lower court decisions that it
finds acceptable when faced with substantial noncompliance by the
lower courts. By expanding the latitude allowed under its precedents,
the Court both cajoles some lower bench jurists to abide by the new
precedents and isolates those who do not. The Court can then focus
its attention on the most egregiously nonconforming lower court deci-
sions, and on the issues it most cares about.
Our theory provides us with a better understanding of when and
how partisan politics will affect judicial doctrine. For example, follow-
ing an election that produces a large and permanent change in the
policy preferences of the elected branches, the new regime can influ-
ence judicial doctrine by manipulating the lower courts. If the newly
elected political branches oppose current doctrine, they can expand
the federal judiciary (that is, pack the lower courts), thereby forcing
the Supreme Court to alter its doctrine. The creation of a large
number of potentially noncomplying lower courts forces a strategic
court to expand its doctrine so that a wider range of lower court deci-
sions is acceptable. To provide evidence for our claims, we examine
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several of the major judiciary acts over the history of the republic.
The evidence suggests that permanent changes in the partisan compo-
sition of the electoral branches-for example, the Jeffersonian ascen-
dancy in 1800, the Republican victory in 1860, and the Democratic
landslide in 1932-all led to a substantial expansion of the lower
courts.
Most importantly, our results imply that long-term doctrinal sta-
bility hinges directly on electoral stability.9 Doctrine results from the
interaction of the courts in the federal hierarchy and depends on the
distribution of preferences among the lower courts and on the
Supreme Court.
This implication about doctrinal stability yields an important co-
rollary: Stare decisis, respect for precedent and the rule of law, is the
by-product of the strategic and political use of doctrine. Stare decisis
reflects a self-enforcing equilibrium of doctrinal preferences among
the courts. The properties of stare decisis do not in fact depend on
whether judges actually respect precedent and the rule of law. Like-
wise, precedents do not constrain the Supreme Court's political use of
doctrine. Rather, Court respect for precedent emerges when the
courts and the political branches are in equilibrium: The Court's doc-
trine, its ability to enforce compliance among the lower courts, and
the actions and threats of action by the elected branches to substitute
their own policy preferences for Court doctrine are in balance.
The plan of the Article is as follows. In Part I, we set forth our
basic argument. In essence, we argue that the elected branches have
the long-term advantage in battling the courts, and in so doing we
identify the potent weapons that the elected branches possess: the
power to fill vacant lower court seats with judges whose preferences
are more compatible with the preferences of the elected branches; the
power to expand the lower courts and therefore increase the propor-
tion of judges who share their beliefs; and the power to affect the pro-
ductivity of the judicial system by altering jurisdictions and controlling
the resources available to the courts for hearing cases.
For the most part, the novelty of our argument derives from our
analysis of the behavior of judges in the lower courts, who are
9. By elections we do not mean the year-to-year electoral vicissitudes caused by marginal
changes in public opinion. We mean instead the long-term stability of the party system itself,
typically lasting longer than a generation.
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modeled as strategic actors facing a trade-off between pursuing a per-
sonal policy agenda and seeing their decisions reversed by a higher
court. The argument is presented in two formats: The main text con-
tains a verbal argument with minimal and simple notation setting
forth its basic logic; the Appendix presents a formal model of the rela-
tionship between higher and lower courts that illustrates how an
exogenous change in the composition of lower courts can change doc-
trine, even though the preferences of the Supreme Court remain
unchanged.
In Part II, we explore the history of the size of the judiciary to
demonstrate that, indeed, episodes of lower court expansion corre-
spond to periods of changes in judicial doctrine that were instigated by
electoral politics, notably Reconstruction and the New Deal. This
Part also presents federal budgetary data on the judiciary that provide
additional evidence concerning the expansion of the judiciary. In Part
M, we examine some specific examples of changes in legal doctrine to
illustrate how they emerged from the mechanisms described in this
Article.
I. A POSITIVE THEORY OF JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
The core assumption of the argument in this Article is that all of
the relevant actors-elected politicians and judges-act rationally to
bring policy as close as possible to their own preferred outcome.10
This assumption need not be swallowed whole: Individual actors may
give weight, to the preferences of others for nonstrategic reasons, such
as altruism, norms of deference, respect for precedent, and other ele-
ments of the rule of law. In particular, we are aware of the standard
idealistic textbook model of judicial behavior, and do not wish to deny
in total the notion that law school education and legal experience pro-
duce a "judicial temperament" that influences decisions by judges.
The key point is that, after accounting for these factors, we assume
that judges do not check their political ideologies at the courthouse
10. Our basic modeling approach is similar to several recent developments in the positive
political theory of the courts. See, eg., Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 6; Eskridge & Ferejohn,
supra note 6; McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory
Interpretation, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 3 (1994); Pablo T. Spiller & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines, 8 J.L EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 8 (1992). The PPT approach
is related to attitudinist perspective, which holds that Supreme Court Justices vote their "atti-
tudes," a concept close in spirit to the justice preferences in our model. The attitudinist ap-
proach differs in that it sees the courts as independent of the elected branches. See JEirv A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THm SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTrUDINAL MODEL (1993).
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door. Thus, we assume that judges and elected politicians accord
some significant weight to personal views about what the government
should do and how government officials should do it, and are willing
to make compromises between judicial and political norms and their
personal policy preferences. The ultimate source of preferences is in-
essential; what matters is that different judges and politicians pursue
different ends.
For purposes of economy of language, we also speak of the
Supreme Court and the elected branches as anthropomorphic entities.
A full theory would need to take into account the fact that the House,
the Senate, and the Supreme Court are collectivities, subject to the
various pathologies of majority rule institutions. A complete theory
would also need to consider the agency relationship between the pres-
ident and the various departments and bureaus in the executive
branch. For the present, we ignore these problems and assume that
the House, Senate, Supreme Court, and president each has a coher-
ent, consistent set of preferences over policy outcomes, and that each
behaves as if it were a single rational actor who takes account of the
preferences and strategies of others in making decisions.
The richness of the judicial system's hierarchy is also largely ig-
nored in our argument. Rather than deal separately with state courts,
federal district courts, federal courts of appeal, and specialized courts,
we simplify reality by grouping them all together as "lower courts"
that make decisions that can be appealed to the Supreme Court. The
number of lower courts is simply the number of lower court judges,
each of whom has consistent personal preferences over policy
outcomes.
We further assume that, at the time of appointment, the policy
preferences of a new judge on issues that have already been litigated
are known without error by the appointing president and confirming
Senate. Thus, we confine "stealth" appointments and mistaken expec-
tations on the part of an appointing president and confirming Senate
to issues that arise after the appointment process is complete.
Whereas the literature documents the difficulties political actors have
had in controlling the Court through supposedly friendly appoint-
ments," examples of unexpected appointments do not vitiate the
proposition that, on average, court appointees do reflect the political
11. See DAVID M. O'BUEN, SToRM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN Poru-
Tncs 81-84 (1986) (providing examples of judges who behaved differently from the way the ap-
pointing president expected).
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views of those who appoint them. Thus, the assumption that the pref-
erences of judges are known in advance covers the preponderance of
cases, and greatly simplifies the analysis because it enables us to avoid
keeping track of random errors in estimates of the policy preferences
of a judicial appointee.
For members of the elected branches, we also assume that their
preferences are derived, in part, from electoral concerns. As is stan-
dard in the neoinstitutionalist theory of politics, the two most impor-
tant factors influencing the preferences of elected officials are the
preferences of constituents (voters, volunteers, contributors) and the
electoral institutions aggregating these preferences. The latter include
the geographic scope of constituencies, the length of terms, qualifica-
tions for office (for example, term limits), and the restrictions gov-
erning behavior during a campaign (such as campaign finance rules).
Here we will not repeat the neoinstitutionalist theory, but it will
suffice to say that the policy preferences derived by elected politicians
are unstable over time and frequently differ among the elected
branches. 2 The reasons are first, that majority rule voting is prone to
some instability as a mechanism for deciding policies (the Condorcet
paradox) and second, that the rules governing elections of the differ-
ent branches of government are significantly different, causing them
to be differentially influenced by each constituency as well as to reflect
aggregations of constituent preferences at different times.
To avoid possible confusion, some attention must be paid to our
definition of a decision as it pertains to each actor in the theory.
For the president, the relevant decisions are whom to recommend
for appointments to the courts. The structure of our theoretical analy-
sis assumes that these nominees are selected on the basis of the presi-
dent's policy preferences, the nominee's policy preferences, and the
anticipated reaction of the Senate in the confirmation process. We do
not deal explicitly with the conventional and theoretically plausible
view that the president has more influence in making appointments to
the Supreme Court than to lower courts;13 however, our model easily
could be extended to account for this phenomenon.
For the elected branches, two kinds of decisions are made. One
consists of confirmation decisions. As in any rational expectations
12. See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Adminis.
trative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989).
13. See O'BREEN, supra note 11.
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model, the real action regarding this decision is not the confirmation
vote per se, but the power that confirmation authority gives the legis-
lature in negotiating appointments. The confirmation process is best
conceptualized as a bargaining session between the president and the
Senate that strikes a compromise in terms of the policy preferences of
the nominee. The other type of legislative decision is legislation that
affects the judiciary. For example: judiciary acts that change the
number of judges and allocate jurisdiction among them; appropria-
tions acts that alter the resources available to the courts for handling
cases (such as budgets for clerks and magistrates); substantive acts
that affect the extent to which citizens use the courts to resolve dis-
putes among themselves or with the government; substantive acts that
explicitly override or constrain court doctrine; and administrative acts
that change the issues and methods that the courts must address in
deciding a particular type of case (such as changes in burdens and
standards of proof).
For the courts, decisions are opinions in cases that not only state
the outcome of a case but explain the basis for it. The term "doctrine"
refers to the principles enunciated by a court to justify its particular
mapping of the factual circumstances of a case into an outcome: who
wins, who loses, and what happens to both the winner and the loser.
As used here, judicial doctrines have a broad meaning. They range
from the very general14 to the highly specific.' 5 We interpret doctrine
as being the set of rules and methods to be used to decide a particular
class of cases. We also allow doctrine to be intentionally nonspecific,
and refer to a concept that we call the "doctrinal interval"-that is,
the range of particular, perhaps inconsistent rules that are acceptable
to the Supreme Court when reviewing decisions by a lower court.
Vague or elastic doctrine can be explicit (for example, a Supreme
Court opinion can state multiple approaches to deciding a particular
type of case) or inferred (for example, the Supreme Court can persist-
ently refuse to resolve inconsistent precedents among the circuit
courts).
Finally, we analyze the system of interactions among the various
actors in the government by imposing a particular sequence in which
14. See, for example, the discussion of the implied constitutional right of privacy in Gris-
wold. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,483-86 (1965) (Douglas, J., opinion of the Court).
15. See, for example, the detailed explication of the so-called Areeda-Turner test for pred-
atory pricing (requiring prices not to fall below average variable cost) in the opinion of then-
appeals court judge, now Justice, Breyer, in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d
227 (1st Cir. 1983).
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they make decisions. The starting point is an exogenous shock that
threatens to upset the existing set of policies. In our model, this hap-
pens in one of two ways: an election changes the derived preferences
of at least one elected branch, or a lower court resolves a new legal
issue in a manner that is controversial among the elected branches and
the Supreme Court. In either case, the shock instigates a sequence of
decisions by each actor to move policy as close as possible to the ac-
tor's preferred position. Each actor is assumed to have rational ex-
pectations and to make decisions in full and correct anticipation of the
actions that will be taken later by the other actors.
.The sequence of decisions among the courts and the elected
branches is somewhat different for the two types of exogenous shocks.
For a shock created by an election, the sequence is as follows.
1. The elected branches decide whether to adopt new policy.
2. If a new policy is adopted, the lower courts make decisions in
cases regarding that policy.
3. The Supreme Court decides whether to take appeals and, if it
decides to do so, issues. its doctrine.
4. Lower courts then decide whether to comply with the doc-
trine in future decisions.
5. The Supreme Court decides which appeals to hear as a means
of forcing compliance on noncomplying lower courts.
6. Steps 1 through 5 are repeated until all decisions remain
unchanged.
If the shock is a new legal issue, the sequence is as follows.
1. The lower court decides (and the loser appeals).
2. The Supreme Court decides whether to hear the appeal, and
if certiorari is granted, issues a decision that establishes a new legal
doctrine.
3. Each lower court in future cases decides whether to comply
with the new doctrine.
4. The Supreme Court decides which appeals to hear as a means
of forcing compliance on noncomplying lower courts.
5. Each elected branch decides whether to attempt an upset of
the new doctrine and, if so, how to do so (for example, substantive
legislation versus changes in the judicial system).
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6. Steps 1 through 5 are repeated until the legal doctrine, the
pattern of lower court decisions, and the previous actions by the
elected branches are unchanged.
The difference between these two sequences is whether the elected
branches act first or last in the sequence of decisions.
A. THE BAsic THEORY OF HIERARCHICAL COURTS
Our starting place for the positive theory of judicial doctrine is
the relationship between the Supreme Court and the lower courts. A
salient fact about decisions to hear an appeal is that the Supreme
Court has limited resources, and so cannot grant a hearing to every
loser in a lower court. To some extent, the number of cases that the
Court can take depends on the resources provided by the elected
branches through the budgetary process. Nevertheless, the range of
variability in the capacity of the Court is small compared to the gap
between the Court's capacity and the number of cases decided by
lower courts. Thus, for simplicity, we assume that the Court has a
fixed "budget" that determines the number of cases that it can hear
each year. In our model of Court decisionmaking we allow the re-
source requirements of different types of cases to differ so that the
Court can make a trade-off between a larger number of relatively un-
demanding cases versus a smaller number of cases that consume more
resources per case. However, for the purpose of simplifying the treat-
ment here, we assume that every case requires the same time and ef-
fort by the Court.
To implement the idea of judicial doctrine, we assume that it con-
sists of a statement about the range of lower court decisions accepta-
ble to the Court on an issue of law. For each legal issue or distinct
combination of legal issues, there is a separate doctrine, and each doc-
trine has the effect of ruling out some outcomes of legal disputes. The
Court has the discretion to make the range of variability in acceptable
outcomes narrow or broad. At one extreme, it can tolerate chaos by
refusing to hear all appeals on a given issue, thereby implicitly estab-
lishing a "doctrine" that any feasible outcome is acceptable. At the
other extreme, the Court can specify completely the outcome that
ought to emanate from a given category of cases, and tolerate no
deviation.
Graphically, the choice of doctrine on any given legal issue can be
represented as shown in Figure 1. Here the choice of doctrine is rep-
resented as the selection of an acceptable subset of the line segment
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FIGURE 1: CHOICE OF DOCTRINE[ (- I )_____
0 1
Sk-rk Sk Sk+rk
from 0 to 1. For simplicity, we depict the doctrinal interval as a sym-
metric region around the Supreme Court's ideal point, Sk, implying
that the Court tolerates deviations of magnitude rk from its most pre-
ferred outcome. In reality, of course, the doctrinal interval would not
necessarily be symmetric, but exposition is facilitated if we assume
that it is for purposes of illustration. The choice of Sk with rk = 0 rep-
resents categorical doctrine that tolerates no deviance, whereas the
interval where rk > 0 represents a doctrine that accepts any lower
court decision within [Sk-rbSk+rk].16 We assume that all of the rele-
vant actors have single-peaked preferences over outcomes for each
distinct type of case.
If the Supreme Court's preferred outcome is Sk, the obvious ques-
tion is whether Sk with rk = 0 will be adopted as a categorical doctrine.
The answer almost certainly is that it will not. In considering whether
to adopt Sk with rk = 0 the Court considers whether noncompliance
with this doctrine is likely and, if so, whether the Court wants to use
its resources to hear appeals of noncomplying decisions. If all lower
court judges also have Sk as their preferred policy, then the Supreme
Court has no incentive to adopt an explicit doctrine. This decision
might create the illusion of doctrinal chaos-a legal issue exists for
which there is no reigning Supreme Court precedent-but in reality
the legal doctrine is inferentially obvious from identical decisions by
all lower courts.
Suppose instead that lower courts have differing preferences, so
that a wide range of outcomes can be expected from cases that raise
identical legal issues. Initially, assume that lower courts do not care
whether their decisions will be reversed. If so, each lower court will
simply make a decision Dk on [0,1] that corresponds to that court's
16. Our analysis does not explicitly take into account the important distinctions in the law
between categories of outcomes in Supreme Court cases. These decisions range from simply
accepting or remanding a decision with minimal comment to major path-breaking opinions that
resemble law review articles, and from joint opinions of a solid majority to a series of sometimes
mutually inconsistent opinions, none of which is accepted by a majority. The variability in the
form, content, and precedential value of these decisions is obviously related to our notion of
judicial doctrine as a range of feasible outcomes, rather than a single point.
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preferred outcome Li,, and virtually all outcomes will be out of com-
pliance with the categorical doctrine Sk (where rk = 0). In principle,
the Court can hear every single appeal, and replace every decision
with its preferred outcome Sk, but in practice this is very unlikely. In
most instances, the Court will regard decisions that depart only
slightly from Sk as not being worth the cost of accepting an appeal and
overturning the decision of the lower court. Because the Court can
take relatively few appeals, it will most likely prefer to take a case on
some other issue where the lower court decision departs from the
Supreme Court's ideal point by a greater amount. Hence, the Court
has reason to adopt a more elastic doctrine (rk > 0) where the
endpoints represent outcomes nearest to Sk for which the gain from
substituting Sk for the lower court decision Dik is worth the opportu-
nity cost in forgone appeals of hearing the case.
In dealing with noncompliance by lower courts, the Supreme
Court's optimal decision rule is to establish a doctrine on each issue
that minimizes the total loss arising from lower court decisions depart-
ing from the Court's ideal decision. Suppose that all cases can be as-
signed to a dimension like that depicted in Figure 1. For each
decision, the Supreme Court receives some utility based on the dis-
tance between the decision Dk and Sk. When an appeal is brought,
the Court inspects the lower court decision and decides whether to
hear the appeal.17 Thus, the decision to accept an appeal is simplified
to two actions: decide whether to bear the cost of the appeal, and, if
the appeal is accepted, change the decision. Here we assume that the
Court will change the decision to its ideal, Sk; however, because re-
versing a lower court decision has value in deterring potentially non-
complying judges, the Court's best strategy may be to move to the
boundary of the doctrinal interval further from the ideal point of the
lower court. Again, for ease of exposition, we ignore this possibility,
and assume that when the Supreme Court reverses a lower court deci-
sion, it picks its own ideal as the new outcome.
Lower courts make some number of noncomplying decisions;
however, the Supreme Court may not be able to review all of them
17. Whereas in reality the Court may not know whether a decision is noncomplying until it
hears the case, for the purposes of discussion we ignore this uncertainty and assume that the
Court costlessly can determine whether a lower court decision is inside or outside its band of
tolerance. All of the core conclusions from the simple model discussed here are retained if the
Court costlessly observes a signal about whether a decision is in compliance, where the
probability of concluding that the decision is not in compliance declines as the lower court's
decision gets closer to the range of acceptable decisions, as discussed in the Appendix.
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due to its limited capacity for appeals. If the number of noncomplying
decisions exceeds the number of appeals that the Supreme Court can
accept, the task of the Court is to accept the cases for which the gain
from taking the appeal is expected to be largest. For any two types of
cases, i and j, the Court will pick its doctrine such that the marginal
cost to the Court of an increment of noncompliance is exactly the
same for both issue dimensions. 8
From the logic of the preceding argument, categorical doctriie
emerges only when there are few (but not zero) noncomplying lower
court decisions, the Court regards the slightest deviation from its doc-
trine as very costly, and the costs of reviewing these cases are smaller
than the benefits. None of these three conditions alone is sufficient to
cause the Court to adopt a narrow doctrine. For example, if the
number of cases is small and the Court finds the hearing of all appeals
feasible, it may not adopt a narrow doctrine if small deviations from
its doctrine are not regarded as very costly. If the court regards even
slight deviations as costly, it still cannot hear all appeals if the number
of cases exceeds the maximum number of appeals that can be taken.
The most important implication from this simple exposition is the
following: A change in the number of cases or in the distribution of
lower court decisions will cause a shift in the judicial doctrine adopted
by the Supreme Court.19
Thus far, the argument has assumed that lower courts simply pick
their preferred outcome,-but this simplification is inconsistent with the
assumption that lower courts are rational optimizers. If lower courts
correctly anticipate the choice of doctrine and accepted appeals by the
Supreme Court, they will not necessarily pick their preferred decision.
Consider the following example in a world with only one type of
case (thus we drop the subscript k). A noncomplying lower court can
pick its preferred policy Li. If there are NC noncomplying decisions
and the Court reviews R appeals, then the lower court faces a
probability R/NC of having the outcome changed to S and a
probability (1-R/NC) of having the outcome remain at L1, for an ex-
pected value of (R/NC) *I Lr S. 0 Alternatively, the lower court can
pick the decision that, while complying with doctrine, is closest to its
18. We have ignored for purposes of discussion here the possibility that the costs of writing
doctrine on the two issues are different.
19. See Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
20. This assumes that the courts have linear Euclidean utility with a slope of -1.
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ideal (for example, the lower court will pick the endpoint of the doc-
trinal interval that is nearest to its ideal decision). This behavior is
illustrated in Figure 2, which adds the preferred decisions of three
lower courts, L 1, L 2, and L 3, to the situation shown in Figure 1.
FIGURE 2: LOWER COURT DECISIONS
L1  L2 L3 S
0 .05 .2 .4 .7 1
To determine the doctrine that the Supreme Court adopts in
equilibrium, we investigate a series of potential choices by the Court.
First, assume that the Supreme Court can review at most one of these
three cases. Suppose that the Court were to announce the narrowest
possible range of acceptable doctrine; in other words, only its ideal
point, S, is acceptable. Under this doctrine, none of three lower
courts will comply. If a lower court did comply, it would obtain the
outcome S = .7 with certainty. If a lower court instead picked its own
ideal point, it would have a 2/3 probability of remaining there and a 1/
3 probability of being reversed to the Supreme Court's ideal, S = .7.
Because noncompliance is no worse and sometimes better than com-
pliance, the lower court would always choose not to comply.
For the Supreme Court, the total losses of the narrow doctrine S
(with r = 0) are nearly 1.0: with 1/3 probability, each court is reviewed
and placed at S for a loss of zero, but with 2/3 probability, each court
remains at its ideal point, for a loss of .65, .5, and .3, respectively.21
Notice that the Court does better if it expands the range of ac-
ceptable decisions. Consider, for example, a range of acceptable deci-
sions of [.49,.91]. In this case, L 3 will comply. If L 3 chooses its ideal
point, then it has a 2/3 chance of remaining at its ideal point (with a
utility loss of 0) and a 1/3 chance of being moved to S (loss of .3), or an
expected loss of .1. If L 3 complies by choosing .49, it loses slightly less
than .1, and so it prefers to comply at point .49. Neither L1 nor L 2 will
comply. The total utility loss for the Supreme Court under this doc-
trine is .785, less by .225 than it received under the choice of narrow
doctrine.'
21. (1/3)0,+ (2/3)(.65+.5+.3) = .967.
22. The expected loss to the Supreme Court from L, is (1/2)(.65) + (1/2)0 =.325; the ex-
pected loss from L 2 is (1/2)(.5) + (1/2)0 = .250, and the loss from L3 is .210. These losses sum to
.785.
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court can do even better if it further
expands its doctrine. Suppose that it increases the range of acceptable
decisions from [.49,.91] to [.44,.96]. This induces L 2 to comply.23 L 2's
behavior, in turn, induces L1 to comply. Because L1 remains the sole
court in noncompliance, it will be reviewed with certainty. L1 there-
fore chooses to comply rather than to be moved to S. The total
Supreme Court losses under this doctrine are .78, preferable to either
of the two choices studied above.2
4
This example illustrates the main mechanism underlying our
model. Doctrine emerges as part of the equilibrium interaction
among the Supreme Court and the lower courts, each acting to maxi-
mize its own preferences or ideology. The Supreme Court sets a nar-
row or wide range of acceptable decisions to induce the optimal
pattern of compliance among the lower courts. Judges in the lower
courts are modeled as strategic actors facing a trade-off between pur-
suing a personal policy agenda and seeing some of their decisions re-
versed by a higher court, and adopting the best available complying
doctrine, without fear of successful appeal.
No general theoretical result can be obtained without further
specification of the key elements of the theory: the number of cases,
the appeals capacity of the Supreme Court, and the ideal points of all
courts. One can construct examples in which doctrinal intervals are
relatively narrow and all lower courts comply, or in which doctrinal
intervals are relatively broad but the number of noncomplying deci-
sions is large. For our purposes, two key results emerge. First, equi-
libria exist having the following properties: (i) the doctrine rules out
some lower court decisions; (ii) noncomplying decisions arise and are
appealed; and (iii) some appeals are taken and the decisions are re-
versed, but others are not, even when the decision by the lower court
is not consistent with established doctrine. Second, these equilibria
yield comparative static results that allow us to examine how shifts in
various political parameters affect the endogenous creation of
doctrine.
The Court can control the degree of noncompliance by changing
the width of the doctrinal interval. A narrowing of the interval is
worthwhile if pulling most of the decisions at the endpoints of the
interval closer to the Court's preferred outcome is more valuable than
23. Complying by L2-choosing .44-yields a loss of.24 whereas not complying and choos-
ing its ideal point yields an expected loss of .25.
24. All courts pick .44, making the loss to the Supreme Court 3*.26 = .78.
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the losses that arise because some lower court decisions move from
the endpoints of the old doctrinal interval to more extreme outcomes
and are not reversed subsequently.
Two important implications of this model relate to the effects of
changing the initial conditions that support the type of equilibrium
described above. First, if the number of lower courts with preferred
positions outside (inside) the doctrinal interval increases, the Court's
doctrinal intervals will expand (contract) and cases, on average, will
exhibif a greater (lesser) mean departure from the Court's preferred
outcome. Second, if the number of cases decided by lower courts in-
creases (decreases), doctrinal intervals expand (contract).
An interesting implication of this analysis is that, for a Court of
fixed size and capacity, a secular growth in caseload in the lower
courts will cause a loss of doctrinal influence by the Supreme Court.
One would expect that, as time passes, federal appeals courts and
state supreme courts will become more influential, and more un-
resolved disagreements will emerge among courts at the same level of
the judicial hierarchy. Of course, if lower courts are more autono-
mous, judicial doctrine becomes more chaotic in that litigants and
legal scholars perceive a wider range of complying decisions and a
greater number of noncomplying decisions that are not successfully
appealed. The only cures for an increase in doctrinal chaos are: (1)
reducing the caseload of the courts by using other dispute resolution
mechanisms or by shrinking their jurisdiction; and (2) creating multi-
ple separate courts at the top of the hierarchy so as to increase the
capacity of the collective supreme courts to take appeals.
B. ENTER THE ELECrED BRANCHES
The starting point for our analysis of the elected branches is the
presence of dissatisfaction among them with judicial doctrine on some
types of cases. Two questions arise: How can the elected branches
affect the equilibrium in judicial doctrine described in the previous
section, and under what conditions will the elected branches succeed
in this attempt?
The first question has two relatively easy answers: The elected
branches can shift policy by passing statutes and appointing judges
who reflect the policy preferences of the elected branches. Most of
the means by which elected politicians influence the judiciary are well-
known, although in some cases the preceding model sheds new light
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on the way in which new legislation and appointments affect judicial
doctrine.
One way to shift judicial doctrine is to pass laws that change the
role of the courts in certain types of cases. For example, the courts
oversee the implementation of policy by the bureaucracy. In setting
up the procedures to govern agency decisionmaking, the elected
branches can make appeals to the court system easy and frequent, or
difficult and rare, by the provisions of legislation that establish the
agency's mandate, decision process and burden of proof, and the
rights to judicial review of agency decisions.25
As an illustration, enactment of legislation giving property own-
ers the right to compensation for federal regulations that reduce the
value of their property would generate an additional basis for litiga-
tion in response to a regulation and would increase the caseload in the
lower courts. Some judges, finding the new law offensive, might re-
fuse to enforce it, generating appeals to the Supreme Court. Unless
the Court cares so little about this issue that it is willing to accept
doctrinal chaos, it will be forced to hear some of these appeals, ini-
tially to establish its doctrine and then later to enforce its decision.
The elected branches also can affect the power of the Court by
passing laws affecting civil litigation. For example, the proposals
before Congress concerning fee shifting and caps on jury awards in
personal injury cases would reduce litigation, and so reduce this
source of appeals. As a result, the Court could devote more resources
to enforcing its doctrine in other areas, leading to narrower doctrinal
intervals and a reduced rate of noncompliance by lower courts. Alter-
natively, the elected branches can reduce the influence of the
Supreme Court by passing statutes that increase the effort the courts
must devote to hearing a particular type of appeal-for example,
switching the standard of proof for an agency decision from "reason-
able basis" to "preponderance of the evidence." Holding fixed the
number of lower courts, this change would reduce the number of cases
by increasing the time and effort devoted to each. Similarly, elected
politicians can influence Supreme Court doctrine by changing the
Court's budget. All else being equal, greater resources allow the
Court to enforce a narrower range of acceptable decisions.
25. See, e.g., McCubbins et al., supra note 12.
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The main implication of these examples is that legal reforms that
superficially appear to be "housekeeping details" about legal proce-
dures can change the ability of the Court to influence policy on com-
pletely unrelated matters. Any significant change in the federal
caseload affects all of the doctrinal intervals established by the Court.
An era of major expansion in judicial review of regulatory decisions,
for example, would reduce the ratio of accepted appeals to total lower
court cases, and so reduce the ability of the Supreme Court to enforce
any given doctrinal interval. The lower courts would respond by in-
creasing the number of noncomplying decisions, and the Supreme
Court would respond by widening the doctrinal interval. Recognizing
this result, if the elected branches seek to weaken the authority of the
Supreme Court, one way to do so is to pass laws that increase the
caseload of the lower courts.
As has long been recognized, the president and the Senate can
influence judicial doctrine by filling vacant judicial posts in a manner
that shifts the preferred outcome of the Supreme Court (by changing
the identity of the median voter on the Court).2 6 Our model shows
that political officials may also affect the Supreme Court's choice of
doctrine by changing the distribution of preferred policies among
members of the lower courts. The mechanism involved in the latter
strategy, in the context of our model, is that the president and the
Senate can appoint judges who are prone to noncomplying decisions,
forcing the Court to expand the tolerable decision interval in Figures 1
and 2.
The new equilibrium after a wave of noncomplying judges are
appointed to the lower courts has two key properties. First, on the
issues over which the Court and the elected branches disagree, the
Supreme Court will take more appeals and reverse more decisions,
whereas on issues on which the Supreme Court and the elected
branches are closer to agreement, there will be fewer appeals and re-
versals. This effect arises as the Court reallocates effort to enforce its
doctrines on the dimensions in which noncompliance has increased.
Second, on all issues, the size of the tolerable decision interval will
increase, so that in general the Supreme Court will lose influence on
all types of cases, not just on the types in which its preferences conflict
with those of the elected branches. This effect occurs because the
26. See, eg., AcERmuAN, supra note 5; TRmE, supra note 8; Gely & Spiller, supra note 3;
Martin Shapiro, The Constitution and Economic Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNrrnD STATES 74 (M. Judd Harmon ed., 1978).
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Court responds to the increase in noncomplying decisions by relaxing
its standards everywhere, to balance the marginal cost of loss of influ-
ence evenly across all issues. Even if every single new judge is in com-
pliance on issues on which the Court and the elected branches agree,
the Court's best response to noncompliance on other issues is to relax
doctrine everywhere.
This conclusion can be illustrated by returning to the example de-
picted in Figure 2. Recall that in this example the Court was able to
achieve complete compliance of the lower courts by setting a rela-
tively wide set of acceptable decisions, the interval [.44,.96]. Suppose
an election inaugurates newly united political branches on the left. To
oppose the Supreme Court's rightward tendencies, the political
branches expand the lower judiciary, say by adding a fourth lower
court, L 4, at the same ideal point as L 1, .05. Without L4 and with the
doctrine set at [.44,.96], L 2 preferred to comply when its probability of
review was 1/2. Adding L4, however, changes this calculus. Under
doctrine [.44,.96] but with the addition of L 4, the probability of review
for -2 fals from 1/2 to 1/3. The smaller threat of review increases L2's
expected value of noncompliance, so it will not comply with this doc-
trine.27 Likewise, neither L, nor L4 will comply. In response to the
expansion of the lower courts, the Supreme Court will expand the set
of acceptable decisions to [.366, 1].
The second effect, expanded intervals across all policy dimen-
sions, tempers the willingness of the elected branches to add noncom-
plying judges to the lower courts. The elected branches will not
expand the lower courts up to the point where the benefits from a
larger number of noncomplying decisions plus a more favorable range
of complying decisions equal the cost of filling another vacant judge-
ship. The reason is that expanding the courts also imposes costs on
the elected branches in areas where they generally agree with existing
Court doctrine. If judges who do not comply with existing doctrine in
one area are added to the lower courts, the Supreme Court will re-
spond by adopting wider doctrinal intervals, including those on which
all branches have the same preferences. Thus, to be willing to add
noncomplying judges to the lower courts as a means of shifting judicial
doctrine, the gap between the Court and the elected branches must, in
some sense, be "large"-that is, the elected branches must differ with
27. Without L4, L2 just barely preferred to comply. With the addition of L4, L2's loss from
complying remains at .24. If it fails to comply and chooses its ideal point, it loses only (1/3)(.5) +
(2/3)0 = .167.
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the Court on a large number of issues (so that generally noncomplying
behavior is regarded as more likely to be good than bad) or by a very
significant amount on a few issues (so that the elected branches are
willing to sacrifice policy in many areas to achieve "better" outcomes
in a few).
Packing the lower courts requires passing a judiciary act that cre-
ates new judgeships, and is an extreme example of filling vacancies
with noncomplying judges. An increase in the number of lower court
judges brings more rapid change in the shift of judicial doctrine than
would arise from simply filling vacancies as they arise. Because court
packing is speedier and causes a greater change in doctrine, both its
benefits and its costs are greater than simply filling vacancies with
noncompliers.
Packing the lower courts is likely to increase the total amount of
litigation because an increase in the number of judges will cause a
reduction in the waiting period between filing a case and reaching an
outcome. This increase in caseload will increase the number of non-
complying decisions, which will force the Court to widen its doctrinal
intervals. The new cases can be expected to have lower stakes, and so
on average to have less social value than the old cases. In particular, if
the elected branches pack the lower courts for the purpose of deriving
policy benefits from more noncomplying decisions and wider doctrinal
intervals, they will add judges beyond the point at which the cost of
the new judgeships and the new cases they create exceeds the social
value of those cases. Thus, court packing creates an external cost-a
form of "judicial pollution" in the form of low-value cases-that both
the existing set of judges and the elected branches would prefer to
avoid. Because court packing is costly to all sides, it will not occur
unless the gap between Court doctrine and the preferences of the
elected branches is extreme. The courts and the elected branches
should be expected to reach some compromise concerning judicial
doctrine rather than to revert to a circumstance in which the elected
branches pack the courts. Consequently, one would expect to find
lower court packing, as opposed to a combination of greater judicial
deference to the preferences of the elected branches plus appoint-
ments of more "friendly" judges to vacancies in the courts, only in
periods immediately following a realigning election in which the new
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elected branches perceive the entire judicial system to be the defender
of a discredited status quo ante.' 8
C. LONG-TERM POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
The most important procedural difference between packing the
courts and simply filling vacancies is the number of elected branches
of government that must be involved. Appointing judges to vacancies
requires cooperation between the president and the Senate, whereas
expansion of the federal court system also requires cooperation with
the House to pass enabling legislation. Likewise, major legislative
changes that alter the workload of the court system - such as chang-
ing jurisdiction or the standards for deciding cases - or that explicitly
reverse Supreme Court decisions also require collaboration among all
three branches. Because the different principles of representation of
the three elected branches cause divergent policy preferences among
them, it is generally easier for two branches to agree than for three, so
that packing and other legislative actions should be relatively difficult
to accomplish. Most of the time legislative changes should be a less
important factor in explaining changes in doctrine than simply filling
vacancies with judges who have preferences similar to the policy pref-
erences of the elected branches. For the political branches to influ-
ence judicial doctrine by statutory methods, the policy differences
between the elected branches and the Supreme Court must be'sub-
stantial. Because the Court is appointed by the last few presidents
and confirmed by the last few Senates, normally Court doctrine will
not be wildly divergent from the preferences of these branches. Thus,
statutory methods of changing doctrine should be rare.
The last means available to the elected branches for influencing
judicial doctrine is a more subtle implication of game theoretic ap-
proaches to judicial behavior, and consists of being able to make cred-
ible threats of statutory action against established doctrine. Just as the
Court will adjust doctrinal intervals in response to changes in the be-
havior of lower courts, the Court will also adjust doctrine to take into
account possible future actions by the elected branches.29
28. The deFigueiredo and Tiller model also suggests this, and their empirical results pro-
vide evidence for this contention. John M. deFigueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional
Control of the.Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Expansion of the Federal
Judiciary (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
29. The basic approach has been used by Eskridge and Ferejohn to examine the conditions
under which a legislature will reverse a noncomplying Supreme Court decision about statutory
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For the elected branches to use statutes or the threat of statutes
to force a shift in judicial doctrine, several conditions are usually re-
quired.30 First, there must be a rather recent, dramatic shift in the
preferences of the elected branches, such as the kind of partisan shifts
that took place around 1860 and 1930. Otherwise, a shift in doctrine
would have already taken place. Second, the differences in prefer-
ences among the elected branches must be small compared to the gen-
eral shift in preferences due to election outcomes. Only under this
condition will the branches be able to reach agreement about how to
change legal doctrine, and either pass relevant legislation or credibly
threaten to pack the lower courts. Third, the shift in electoral politics
must be reasonably durable. Because of the election cycle in the Sen-
ate, at least two elections are almost always required to cause a major
change in that body. Moreover, appointing new judges also takes
time. Hence, durability is usually required for statutory methods to be
used to influence judicial doctrine, and the perception of durability is
necessary for the Court to shift doctrine in response to a credible
threat of legislation.
The Court is not without weapons to deal with attempts by the
political branches to shift its doctrine. The Court can be expected to
prefer strongly that the elected branches shift its doctrine by passing
specific substantive statutes and by filling vacancies with noncomply-
ing judges than by packing the lower courts. Court packing, because it
generates more cases, weakens the power of the Court more than ob-
taining the same distribution of preferences among lower court judges
by filling vacancies. This effect arises from the fixed capacity of the
Court to hear appeals and the importance of the ratio of Court capac-
ity to total decisions in determining the power of the Court to enforce
its doctrines. Hence, the Court should be willing to acquiesce to some
extent on the areas of judicial doctrine on which it disagrees with the
elected branches in order to stave off court packing and to preserve its
authority on other issues. Because the elected branches prefer that
the Court retain doctrinal authority in areas where all the branches
interpretation, and the best response of the Court to the prospect of statutory reversal. See
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 6.
30. In addition to the mechanism described in this paragraph, another mechanism is an
unanticipated novel decision by the Court. Such a decision might arise from the emergence of a
new issue or stealth appointments. Here the event that opens a large gap in policy preferences
between the Court and the elected branches is a shift by the Court, rather than a shift by the
elected branches. Because the Court is appointed by the president and the Senate, this pathway
for a distinct, dramatic political intervention to influence doctrine ought to be rare.
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agree, a deal that at least limits the extent of packing is likely to be
feasible.
FIGURE 3: POLICY CONFLICr BETWEEN THE COURT
AND THE ELECTED BRANCHES
[ _______I ___________________I............I __ _______________l
C H P S
Typically the Court will prefer to adopt its own doctrinal changes
rather than to wait for change by substantive statute. The reason is
that the Court can take advantage of differences that exist among the
elected branches. Passing a statute requires either a supermajority in
each legislative branch or unanimous agreement among a majority in
each legislative branch plus the president. If the Court establishes a
doctrine before the elected branches act, it can foreclose the possibil-
ity of legislative action if it picks a policy that would create disagree-
ment among the elected branches about the proper form of response.
The potential for using this strategy is illustrated by the example de-
picted in Figure 3. The preferred policies for each branch are shown
as C (Supreme Court), H (House), P (President), and S (Senate), and
the established doctrine is assumed to be C. If the elected branches
succeed in attacking this doctrine by statute, theoretically they are
expected to enact a policy somewhere between H and S. This range of
policies represents the possible compromises between the two legisla-
tive branches, and for each branch including the president any policy
in this range is closer to the ideal point of that branch than to C. If the
Court anticipates that such legislation is likely, it can assure a better
outcome for itself by adopting P, for then, ignoring the possibility of
veto overrides, the president will veto all bills that attempt to alter this
doctrine.
The Court will also have preferences over how it compromises
with the elected branches. Specifically, the Court would prefer to
widen the doctrinal interval-indeed, perhaps simply to withdraw
from hearing appeals from all but the most extreme lower court deci-
sions-than to adopt the doctrine preferred by the elected branches.
This strategy enables the Court to preserve some decisions that corre-
spond to its preferred outcome. Of course, the interval cannot be so
wide that it invites more statutory intervention, but the Court gener-
ally can expect that the elected branches will not bear the costs of
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statutory intervention if the doctrinal interval includes some outcomes
in the range of feasible legislation (as defined by P, H, and S in Figure
3) and otherwise does not deviate too far from this range.
The last means by which the Court can protect its discretion is to
attempt to contest the elected branches politically by making disagree-
ments between the Court and the elected branches a political issue.
For this strategy to make sense, the Court must anticipate that the
shift in election outcomes is, or could be made to be, temporary. Be-
cause filling vacancies and packing the lower courts takes time-and
probably at least two election cycles-the Court has the option of fill-
ing this period with highly visible decisions that focus public attention
on the policy implications of shifting from the old political regime
(now represented only by the Court) to the new, with the hope of
causing a backlash.
As a tactical matter, the Court's method can be to change case
selection and judicial doctrine in precisely the opposite manner from
that which would occur if the political change is widely perceived as
durable. That is, in Figure 3, if current doctrine is somewhere be-
tween C and P, the Court can make an "in your face" decision by
moving doctrine closer to C. Such a decision will highlight the differ-
ences between the Court and the political branches. Similarly, the
Court could reapportion its appeals in favor of the issues in dispute
with the elected branches, reversing more noncomplying decisions
than would be rational if the system were in doctrinal equilibrium.
This strategy causes the Court temporarily to sacrifice some influence
on other issues where the disagreements with the elected branches are
small (by reversing fewer noncomplying decisions on those issues) as
an investment in retaining greater control in the future.
From these arguments we derive the sufficient conditions for
electoral politics to be the source of a significant shift in judicial doc-
trine. We would expect judicial doctrine to shift after major electoral
realignments that sweep across all three elected branches. But to the
extent that these electoral sweeps are of doubtful durability, we would
expect the effect of the elected branches on doctrine to be small, and
for the Court to adopt a relatively visible strategy of fighting the
newly elected officials. This phenomenon is more likely if the scope of
disagreement between the Court and the elected branches is great
(that is, it involves many legal issues). When disagreements are con-
fined to relatively few issues, the Court is more likely to respond to a
major shift in electoral politics by essentially abandoning significant
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enforcement of doctrine in the areas of disagreement so as to preserve
its authority elsewhere.
The necessary condition for a shift in doctrine is that the relation-
ship of preferences among the Court and the elected branches shifts to
broaden or narrow the range of judicial discretion. For example, if an
election durably shifts the most preferred policy of one elected branch
to a position near the preferred policy of the Court, the Court can
safely change doctrine toward its preferred position without fear of
reversal by either substantive statutes or a court-packing judiciary act.
If the shifting body is either the president or the Senate, the long-run
threat of noncomplying appointments for vacant positions also disap-
pears. An immediate application of this insight is the congressional
elections of 1994. If the shift is perceived by the Court as having a
reasonable prospect for being durable, it can be expected to be fol-
lowed by a wave of decisions that break established precedent in ways
generally favored by the Republican majorities on the Court and in
Congress.
II. HISTORICAL CHANGES IN THE JUDICIARY
Political change in America is driven by elections. The election of
1932, for example, brought wholesale changes in public policy, the
composition of government, and political competition. The elections
of 1974 and 1976 saw the end of the conservative coalition that limited
Democratic hegemony since 1937. The election of 1980 produced a
partisan division between the House and Senate for the first time
since 1932 and, together with Republican control of the presidency,
produced lasting changes in federal policy. While few elections pro-
vide as jarring a shift in policy as did the election of Republican ma-
jorities to the House and Senate in 1994, every election engenders
some policy effects.
We have argued that the Court, in its choice of doctrine, is driven
by the same general electoral forces that drive American politics.
Generation-long eras of stability in judicial doctrine reflect an under-
lying stability in the electoral and partisan arenas. When elections
bring about a permanent change in the majority party, elements cen-
tral to judicial doctrine will also change. Though it is not surprising
that electoral politics shapes public policy, the electoral effects on ju-
dicial doctrine are subtle, and have not been thoroughly examined.
Some scholars have looked for direct effects of electoral change on
the Court and have found few such effects. Others have looked for
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the effect of public opinion on Court decisions and have found mixed
results. Neither group has studied the mechanism of change that we
have hypothesized.
Any influence of electoral politics on judicial doctrine must be
mediated by the first two branches of government. This mediation
affects judicial doctrine both directly and indirectly. Direct actions by
the executive and legislative branches of government can include re-
structuring the court system, changing court procedures and jurisdic-
tion, and making appointments to the bench. Partisan realignments in
the elected branches have led to major amendments to the judiciary
acts, the creation of new courts and court systems, and the adoption of
large, omnibus judgeship appointment measures. Many scholars have
documented the effect of politics on judicial appointments and behav-
ior. By contrast, our focus is on how the broad scheme of appoint-
ments and changes in the structure of the courts reshape the judiciary
in bold, dramatic, and partisan ways.
The changes in the size of the federal bench correspond to our
expectations." Of the 403 judgeships added to the lower federal
bench from 1869 to 1968, all but twenty-two were added during peri-
ods of unified party control. The circuit court of appeals has been
expanded thirty-five times since 1802. All but four of these expan-
sions came during periods of unified party control of government.
Only two of these exceptions were significant increases, and both were
quite recent, involving increases during the Reagan and Bush pre-
sidencies. Franklin Roosevelt, with the aid of Democratic majorities
in both houses of Congress, expanded the circuit court by more than
twenty-five percent.
The most significant changes in the size and structure of the fed-
eral bench occur after a partisan realignment of the first two branches
of government.32 The wrangling and maneuvering over the size and
shape of the federal bench at the end of the Federalist era and the
beginning of the era of the Jeffersonian Democrats are legendary.
The writing and repealing of judiciary acts as well as the appointment
and refusal of positions to magistrates, culminating in Marbury v.
Madison,33 exemplify partisan efforts to affect doctrine.
31. For a similar argument and supporting evidence, see DeFigueiredo & Tiller, supra note
28.
32. Our data are taken from Gerard S. Gryski et al., Partisan Transformation of the Federal
Judiciary, 1869-1992,21 AM. PoL. Q. 439 (1993), and Gerard S. Gryski et al., The Federal Judici-
ary and Institutional Change (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Fighting over control of the bench did not end with Jefferson's
presidency. During Reconstruction, the Republicans not only
amended the Constitution to reverse the Court's decision in Dred
Scott v. Sandford,34 but enacted sweeping changes to the structure of
the judiciary through a series of judiciary acts in the 1860s and 1870s.
By these means and through judicial appointments, the Republicans
brought about mammoth change in the composition of the lower fed-
eral bench. Ulysses Grant's appointments alone accounted for a
swing of more than twenty-six percentage points in the proportion of
Republicans on the bench. Republican control of the bench contin-
ued throughout the period of Republican dominance of national poli-
tics, with the Republicans controlling over eighty percent of the lower
courts when William Taft left office and over seventy-five percent
when Franklin Roosevelt was inaugurated.
Franklin Roosevelt sought to transform the federal bench, and
while he failed initially to persuade the Supreme Court to accept the
New Deal, he was able to bend the lower courts in the Democratic
direction. The Democrats expanded the bench by more than twenty-
five percent during Roosevelt's first two terms, and he ultimately
made 184 appointments to the lower courts (out of approximately 250
lower court judges). After a brief interlude of Republican congres-
sional control in the early post-World War II era, the return of unified
Democratic control brought Harry Truman the largest increase in the
size of the federal bench to that time. Much like Olympic pole vault-
ing records, the Truman expansion was then surpassed in the short
span of two congressional periods by Dwight Eisenhower and the
Republicans.
The seemingly "can you top this" expansion of the federal judici-
ary and the partisan competition to control the bench continued after
Eisenhower left office. After thwarting the attempts of the Judicial
Conference to gain an increase in the size of the federal bench during
the last six years of Eisenhower's presidency, the Democrats gave
John Kennedy seventy-three new judgeships, the largest increase in
the federal bench to that point. Democratic expansion continued with
an additional forty-five new positions under Lyndon Johnson. More
recently, Jimmy Carter, president when the liberal wing of the Demo-
cratic party controlled Congress, was the beneficiary of the largest sin-
gle increase in the federal bench, 152 new positions.
34. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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An examination of judicial appropriations from 1923 to 1989 pro-
vides similar support for our thesis .3 Appropriations for the first half
of this time period are given in Figure 4. The first substantial increase
in appropriations, after the initial, unified Republican efforts in the
1920s, is a jump after the election of 1936. This corresponds to
Roosevelt and the Democrats' battle with the Supreme Court as well
as a landslide election. The next significant increase followed the 1948
election when the Democrats regained unified control of the govern-
ment. The 1956 fiscal year increase occurs when the Democrats re-
captured the House and the Senate. Because most judges had been
appointed by Roosevelt or Truman, an expanded capacity for hearing
cases would be expected generally to reflect Democratic values. Fig-
ure 5 provides appropriations for the second part of the period, 1957
to 1989. The notable increase in the 1975 fiscal year is due generally
to the continued decline of the conservative coalition, and specifically
to the House changes surrounding the Watergate scandal. 6 Finally,
the growth in the 1980s follows from Republican control of the presi-
dency and the Senate.
The changes wrought in the judiciary through constitutional
amendments, reforms of the judiciary acts, creation (or abolishment)
of new court systems, reforms of the civil and criminal codes, changes
in the pay and benefits for jurists, and appointments to the federal
bench all seem to correspond well with our hypothesis that after sub-
stantial partisan changes in the elected branches of government, legis-
lation and appointments will be used to influence judicial outcomes.
The remaining question is whether these actions have the predicted
effect on judicial doctrine.
III. PARTISAN EFFECTS ON DOCTRINE
What determines the content and stability of judicial doctrine? In
this section, we derive comparative static results from the theory de-
scribed in Part I and stated formally in the Appendix in order to arrive
at testable hypotheses concerning doctrinal shifts, which we then ex-
amine with specific examples.
Our theoretical model yields an equilibrium set of doctrinal deci-
sions by the Supreme Court that have the following implications: The
Court will announce more narrow bands on issues it cares more about;
35. Note that a similar examination of budget estimates for these years yields nearly identi-
cal results. Also, Figures 4 and 5 are standardized in 1982-84 dollars.
36. See DAVID W. RHODE, PARTs AND LEADERS IN THE Posr REFoRM HousE (1991).
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less dispersion between the ideal policies of the lower courts and the
Supreme Court will cause a narrower range of acceptable decisions;
an increase in the resources available to the Court will cause the range
of acceptable decisions to narrow; the appointment to the lower courts
of judges with a political ideology different from the elected officials
who appointed the Court that created established doctrine will create
doctrinal instability by widening the range of lower court decisions
acceptable to the Court and, if the political change is durable, eventu-
ally will cause doctrine to shift and narrow in the direction preferred
by the new political alignment.
These theoretical results point to several political factors that, be-
yond the obvious influence of appointments to the Supreme Court,
influence the doctrinal equilibrium achieved by the courts. Here, we
summarize some of the political weapons that directly affect the
Supreme Court's doctrinal decisions and the effects of electoral poli-
tics on the decision to use them.
First, political officials can indirectly affect doctrine by changing
the resources available to the Supreme Court, thus affecting the
Court's capacity for reversing defiant lower courts: for example, the
Court's budget, the number of bailiffs, the number of issues under the
Court's jurisdiction, and the flexibility given to the Court by substan-
tive legislation. The relevant test of the theory here is that legislative
changes affecting the balance of resources and caseload in the Court
should be associated with changes in doctrine that reflect the prefer-
ences of the elected branches.
Second, the elected branches can expand the lower courts. After
a political realignment, this expansion changes the distribution of
opinions among the lower courts and therefore affects the Supreme
Court's ability to enforce its doctrine. The relevant test of our theory
is the proposition that an expansion of the lower courts forces doctri-
nal uncertainties and inconsistencies, which in our terminology is a
larger doctrinal interval.
Creating specialized courts is a mechanism of political control
similar to packing the lower courts. Congress and the president have
created, and sometimes dismantled, such courts in a dozen areas over
the last 120 years. New specialized courts not only remove the juris-
diction over a set of issues from the lower courts (or from both the
Supreme Court and the lower courts), but they allow political officials
to populate the new courts with judges whose views closely accord
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with their own.37 Our theory predicts that these events will occur af-
ter major political realignments, and that they will affect judicial doc-
trine not only in the specific areas affected by the jurisdictional
change, but in other areas where the newly elected political leaders
disagree with established doctrine.
In sum, the pattern of judicial doctrine, including constitutional
jurisprudence, depends not only on the interaction of judges within
the judicial hierarchy, but on the direct and indirect effects of political
officials. In the remainder of this part, we develop the implications of
our approach in three areas of doctrine: labor injunctions early in this
century, the role of stare decisis and the rule of law, and the confron-
tation between the Supreme Court and political branches during the
New Deal, including a new interpretation of Nebbia v. New York.38
A. LABOR INJUNCTIONS
The history of labor injunctions appears to illustrate our theory.
The relevant labor law history divides into four periods. 39 First is a
formative period from 1877-95 in which federal judges created the la-
bor injunction and, after 1890, used the Sherman Antitrust Act40 as a
potent anti-labor weapon. Second, 1896-1921 marks a period of ex-
perimentation when judges developed limits on the use of labor in-
junctions. In the third period, from 1921-38, courts removed the limits
set in the previous period. Finally, from 1938 onward, the labor in-
junction has been severely limited by both judicial opinions and con-
siderably more explicit direction from federal legislation.
Each of the turning points dividing these periods reflects major
changes in the partisan composition of the elected branches, and sev-
eral seem to involve the interaction of the lower courts and the
37. Moreover, the threat of removing a jurisdiction from the Court may have an indirect
effect even when specialized courts are not created. This conclusion follows from the application
of John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan's model. John A. Ferejohn & Charles R. Shipan, Congres-
sional Influence On Administrative Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy, in
CoN REss RECONSMERED 393 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 4th ed. 1989).
They show conditions under which threats of legislation, even without passage, are sufficient to
shift an administrative agency's decisions. Although Ferejohn and Shipan studied the interaction
of Congress and an administrative agency, precisely the same logic applies for the interaction of
Congress and the Court.
38. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
39. The details that follow derive primarily from WIwLA N. EsKcunoE, JR., DYNAMIC
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 81-109 (1994).
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1988).
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Supreme Court. The second period reflected the rise of the progres-
sives, the split in the Republican party, and the election of Woodrow
Wilson in 1912. William Eskridge calls Wilson's election a watershed
for limits on the labor injunction.41 Not only were Wilson's appoin-
tees to the courts generally opposed to labor injunctions, but the Clay-
ton Act, passed by Congress in 1914, became a powerful tool to limit
injunctions.4' The second period came to an abrupt end when the
Republicans recaptured united government in 1920. Finally, the third
period ended as Roosevelt and the New Dealers wrested control
of the courts from the Republican appointees of previous
administrations.
Perhaps of greatest interest from our perspective is the swing in
policy after 1920. According to Eskridge:
Notwithstanding [Chief Justice] Taft's early effort at balance,
the 1920s were the heyday of the federal labor injunction, with hun-
dreds issued .... [T]he Court's decisions in Duplex, Tri-City, and
Hitchman Coal were rebukes to federal circuit judges who sought to
remove the judiciary from labor disputes. In each case the Supreme
Court laid out litigation strategies for employers to follow in com-
plaining about strikes (allege contract violations under Hitchman
Coal), picketing (allege violence and threats under Tri-City), and
boycotts (allege secondary activity under Duplex).43
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering illustrates our themes.
44
Consistent with the pro-labor decisions of the second period, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals announced in Duplex Printing a broad
interpretation of Section 20 of the Clayton Act, allowing secondary
boycotts. 45 Three years later, the Supreme Court not only reversed,
replacing the Second Circuit's broad reading with a narrow one, but
ushered in the new anti-labor period with considerable parallels to the
rulings of the first period.46 What makes Duplex Printing interesting
is that the Supreme Court issued its ruling just after the 1920 elections,
before any changes in the composition of the lower courts or the
Supreme Court had been made. Partisan change in election outcomes
appears to have influenced the Supreme Court's decision, but how
41. See EsKRGmrE, supra note 39, at 93.
42. For example, "[s]ection 6 [of the Clayton Act] overrode at least part of the injunction
against the United Mine Workers in Hitchman Coal." IL at 96.
43. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
44. 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
45. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 252 F. 722 (2d Cir. 1918).
46. Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. 443.
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would that have allowed the Court to defend a narrower range of ac-
ceptable doctrine in the lower courts?
After capturing united government in 1920, the Republicans fo-
cused considerable effort on the courts. Several Supreme Court ap-
pointments early in the decade allowed the Republicans to expand the
Court's pro-business coalition. Republicans also expanded the lower
judiciary, filling these positions with judges sympathetic to their views
and those of the working majority on the Supreme Court.
Duplex Printing signaled a change in doctrine. Although the
Supreme Court's decisions during the first two years of the decade
were not as anti-labor as its decisions following 1922, they were less
pro-labor than the decisions over the previous decade. Had the sole
shift in doctrine occurred in 1923, following changes on both the
Supreme Court and the lower courts, we would not be surprised. But
the initial and important doctrinal shift during 1921-22, reflecting deci-
sions more conservative than the previous years, also requires
explanation.
Our theory suggests the following interpretation. The 1920 elec-
tion, signaling the return of a closer harmony between the Supreme
Court and the elected branches, enabled the Court to narrow its range
of acceptable doctrine. The anticipated expansion of the lower courts
meant more Republican judges sympathetic to the conservative
Court's views, suggesting that the proportion of cases heard by pro-
gressive Republican and Democratic judges would decline. That, in
turn, would make it easier for the Supreme Court to enforce a nar-
rower range of acceptable decisions, for the number of lower court
decisions with which a majority disagreed would decrease. As the
Republicans were able to expand the lower courts and make appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court, the Court's decisions turned decidedly
anti-labor. We also hypothesize that the type of cases brought to the
courts changed. Anticipating a doctrinal shift toward business, firms
would bring new cases that would have been won by labor under the
old precedents but which might now be decided for business.
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B. DOCTRINAL STABILITY, STARE DECisIS, AND SELF-
ENFORCING EQUILIBRIA
Our theory provides a new perspective on doctrinal stability and
stare decisis.47 The traditional approach to these issues holds that
judges are constrained in their decisionmaking by precedent and
seemingly settled doctrine. But the extent and force of this constraint
has only been operationalized with respect to stability and predictabil-
ity as valuable ends in themselves. 48 Most legal scholars recognize
that the Supreme Court exercises some latitude, for example, with re-
spect to constitutional decisions.49 When does the constraint of prece-
dent arise and how is it binding?
Some legal scholars argue that judges have positive preferences
for stability and precedent, partially inculcated by the process of legal
training and socialization. A conspicuous problem with this view is its
inability to predict anything other than stability in doctrine. For ex-
ample, it cannot predict the turning points in jurisprudence that break
with the past, such as the three constitutional eras described by Bruce
Ackerman"° or the seven constitutional models described by Laurence
Tribe.5 Nor can it explain how adherence to the rule of law is consis-
tent with a wide range of acceptable decisions, and why some issues
seem to have wide doctrinal intervals while others have a narrow
range.
In our theory, doctrinal clarity and stability do not depend on the
willfulness of judges, nor on the success of their socialization in law
school. Rather, doctrinal clarity and stability reflect underlying elec-
toral stability. Stare decisis is not an exogenous constraint or a
learned response to temptation, but a self-enforcing equilibrium in
47. In his classic treatise, Walter Murphy comes closest to articulating a view similar to
ours. See WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 30-31 (1964). See also Lewis
A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 63 (1980) (pro-
viding another game-theoretic interpretation of stare decisis as a coordination mechanism).
48. The basic idea of this class of arguments is that if people are risk-averse, they will be
willing to trade some degree of optimality in return for a reduction in the variance of policy.
Bruce Owen and Ronald Braeutigam used this to develop a theory of why citizens prefer ineffi-
cient regulation to efficient competition. BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THm REa.
ULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF ADMIISTRATrVE PROCESS (1978). Frank Michelman's
concept of "demoralization cost" (socially destructive responses to seemingly arbitrary changes
in public policy), although not articulated in this way, is certainly a close cousin of this concept.
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 1165, 1214 (1967).
49. See, eg., ACKERMAN, supra note 5.
50. See id
51. See TRmE, supra note 8.
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which judges have no incentive to break with established precedent.
This equilibrium reflects the interaction of political officials, the
Supreme Court, and the lower courts. The Supreme Court sets doc-
trine to gain adherence by the lower courts; the lower courts decide
whether to respect doctrine; and political officials in the elected
branches set the parameters constraining the courts, such as the re-
sources available to the Supreme Court to review cases and the size of
the lower courts. Electoral stability underpins the stability and clarity
of judicial preferences, in turn leading to an equilibrium among the
Supreme Court and lower courts based on the Supreme Court's
choice of doctrine. Acting individually, no judge has an incentive to
deviate. Respect for precedent-that is, the stability of doctrine and
the degree of adherence to it by the courts-reflects settled politics on
the issue in question. Bright line doctrine-that is, a narrow range of
acceptable lower court opinions-also reflects stable politics in which
the Court is not forced to accommodate a wide variety of preferences,
all of which have or might soon have substantial voice among the
elected branches as well as the lower courts.
Temporary electoral shifts are rarely sufficient to provide elected
officials leverage over the courts. Only permanent electoral shifts-
for example, those occurring in 1800, 1860, and 1932-grant the
elected branches both the motives and the means for massive inter-
vention to change longstanding judicial doctrine.5 2
This discussion of stare decisis yields a surprising and nonintuitive
conclusion. Legal scholars have generally resisted the standard as-
sumption of positive political theory that judges pursue their own
preferences or ideologies.53 These scholars emphasize that judges in-
stead hold a range of additional values-such as the rule of law, re-
spect for precedent, and due process rights of citizens-that are far
more important in shaping their decisions than are their own
preferences.
52. One qualification is when a temporary shift in hegemonic control allows a minority
party to obtain considerable influence over the Supreme Court because it is able to make an
unusual number of appointments while in control. For example, during the Wilson administra-
tion, the Democrats held united government in an abidingly Republican era and were able to
make a number of Supreme Court appointments because of retirements.
53. A particularly interesting example of this is expressed by Judge Abner Mikva. See
Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). Mikva's views in his introduction to a
symposium on the theory of public choice stand in striking contrast to most papers in the
symposium.
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Our approach suggests that these larger, socially valuable goals,
such as the respect for precedent and the rule of law, are a by-product
of the more narrow and limited goals of pursuing personal policy
objectives. Once a self-enforcing equilibrium is achieved, precedent
and doctrine remain stable as long as the party system remains stable
and no new legal issues arise. Historically, periods of single-party
dominance lasting longer than a generation, such as the New Deal
Democratic era, have produced considerable doctrinal stability, which
is manifested as respect for precedent and adherence to the rule of
law. These properties of the system may even be articulated as strong
values underlying the judiciary, in part because this rhetoric is useful
when higher courts rebuke lower ones. But in our theory, doctrinal
stability and the rule of law do not derive from first principles or the
beliefs and values of judges but from the equilibrium between the
political branches and the judiciary. Thus, models of judicial choice,
precedent, and the rule of law need not invoke ad hoc assumptions
such as a preference for precedent to explain doctrinal stability.
This conclusion yields a further implication. The assumption that
judges pursue their own preferences or ideologies does not imply that
jurisprudence merely reflects naked interest group influence, a simple
contest over ideology, or an absence of respect for the rule of law.
When doctrinal equilibrium emerges, individual judges are highly con-
strained in their behavior and cannot impose their will or ideology on
the nation. Over the long run, judicial choice of doctrine reflects the
preferences expressed in the electoral arena. As Robert McCloskey
suggests, a Supreme Court with doctrinal preferences at variance with
a set of united political branches is highly unlikely to maintain its pre-
ferred doctrine for any length of time.54
C. COURTS, ELECTION RETURNS, AND THE NEW DEAL
Our theory provides clarification of the notion that the "courts
follow the election returns." While stability in judicial doctrine de-
pends upon stability in the underlying electoral system, the judicial
system is insulated from short-run electoral vicissitudes. Looking
backward to the New Deal controversy, we now know that the 1932
election initiated a new era in American politics, redefining the role of
the federal government in the economy. Moreover, among legal
scholars it is now well understood that this election was the cause of a
struggle over judicial doctrine that ended in victory for the elected
54. See MCCLosKEY, supra note 2, at 23.
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branches over a recalcitrant judiciary. Further, it is easy to see that
most Americans, far more than bare majorities, supported this change
from the mid-1930s onward. The Supreme Court's confrontation with
the elected branches is most frequently viewed as an entire nation pit-
ted against "nine old men" with outdated, and misguided, notions
about the Constitution and the role of the federal government in the
economy.
In the context of our theory, the confrontation between the
Supreme Court and the New Deal was both strategic and predictable.
The years before 1932 were an abidingly Republican era, initiated sev-
enty-two years earlier with the election of Lincoln. Between 1860 and
1932, the Republicans dominated elections. In the thirty-six congres-
sional periods, the Republicans held united government in over half,
including several decade-long periods (1860-74, 1896-1910, 1920-30).
The Democrats, by contrast, held united government in only four peri-
ods. With the exception of the Wilson administration, the Republi-
cans' electoral dominance enabled them to enact their programs
during periods of united political control and defend them against
change in periods of divided control.
In contrast to the Democrats, Republican influence was enhanced
during divided government because they typically held control of both
the presidency and the Senate. Even under divided government, the
Republicans usually controlled appointments to the Court, holding
these two branches during twenty-four of the thirty-six Congresses in
this period, while the Democrats held both in only four.55
When Roosevelt was elected in 1932, few could have been certain
that this election would usher in the New Deal era and Democratic
hegemony. At the time, the Democrats' hold over national govern-
ment appeared tenuous. Given that New Deal policies sought a radi-
cal departure from the status quo in both public policy and
constitutional interpretation, a rational Republican-dominated Court
55. 'The Republicans assured their virtually constant control of the Senate by the strategic
admission of very sparsely populated Republican states in the west. For example, the Dakota
Territory was admitted as four states, three of which were Republican, thirty years before the
admission of New Mexico, which had a much larger population but suffered Democratic sympa-
thies. See David W. Brady & Roger G. Noll, Public Policy and the Admission of the Western
States, in TIE POLMCAL ECONOMY OF =rm AMERICAN WEsT 147 (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J.
Hill eds., 1994); Charles Stewart III & Barry R. Weingast, Stacking the Senate, Changing the
Nation: Republican Rotten Boroughs, Statehood Politics, and American Political Development, in
STuDIEs IN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 6, at 223-71 (1992).
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would have sought to constrain the Democrats. 6 Not knowing
whether the electoral shift was temporary or permanent, the Supreme
Court would be expected to slow down the Democrats' radical depar-
ture from the status quo in hopes that, in an election one or two cycles
in the future, the Republican regime would reemerge.
The Court had an incentive to exacerbate the controversy. By
focusing public attention on the New Deal's radical departure from
the constitutional principles underpinning the old political regime, the
Court may have hoped for a political backlash.5 7 A strategic confron-
tation of this type would require the Court to alter its case selection so
as to feature issues that were in sharp dispute and were most likely to
be approved by voters. But a change in case selection criteria, given
the limited capacity of the Court to hear appeals, would cause the
Court to sacrifice influence in other areas. The Court would adhere to
this strategy until it became convinced that the political change of
1932 was permanent.
The sequence of elections after 1932 provided evidence that the
Democrats were immensely popular and that their success was not
transitory. The 1934 elections remain one of the few mid-term elec-
tions when the party of the president increased its representation in
Congress. In the 1936 elections, the Democrats came close to holding
the supermajorities necessary to amend the Constitution: two thirds of
each branch of Congress and three quarters of the state legislatures.5 8
Looking backward, it is easy to disparage the uncertainty facing
the country prior to November 1936. We will never know whether
Justice Roberts' famous "switch in time" in January 1937 reflected the
realignment evident in the 1936 election or other pressures.59 The fact
remains that the Court's conflict with the New Deal was confined to
the period of uncertainty over the New Deal's long-term success,
56. This judgment reflects the individual rationality assumption of positive political theory
models and does not imply a judgment that the Court's actions were socially rational (in other
words, that they were good for the country).
57. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Taney seems to have applied the same strategy
with Dred Scott in 1857. Set in the context of the growing controversy over slavery, Dred Scott
ruled that the policies sought by the Republicans were unconstitutional. See DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, Tim DRED ScoTr CASE: ITs SIONWICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLIrIcs
(1978).
58. See Gely & Spiller, supra note 3, at 60-61.
59. See, e.g., DAVID P. CuRIE, Tim CONSTITUON IN THE SUPREME COURi. THE FIRsT
HUNDREoD YEARS, 1789-1889, at 26 (1985); McC.os EY, supra note 2, at 175-77; SHAPIRO, supra
note 1.
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1933-36. Once the evidence demonstrated that support for Demo-
crats was not an aberration but a direct reflection of massive political
support for their policies, the confrontation between the Supreme
Court and the political branches came to an abrupt end.
D. A NEw Vmw oF NEBBA v. NEW YORK
The Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence during its con-
frontation with the New Deal was not necessarily inconsistent. Most
discussions focus only on issues arising out of the national govern-
ment, such as the New Deal's Agricultural Adjustment Administra-
tion6° and the National Industrial Recovery Act.61 Before 1937, the
Court consistently ruled that major elements of the New Deal were
unconstitutional. In this context, it is rarely explained why the Court
made a remarkable break with the past in other areas of nearly paral-
lel constitutional questions concerning the states.
During the Lochner era of substantive due process, the Supreme
Court carefully scrutinized the means and ends of state economic leg-
islation and set aside many state laws. The Court held in Lochner v.
New York that state legislation must have a "direct relation, as a
means to an end, and the end itself must be appropriate and legiti-
mate, before an act can be held to be valid."'62
In the midst of its confrontation with the New Deal, the Court
announced the end of substantive due process with respect to the
states in Nebbia v. New York:
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in
the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to
adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to pro-
mote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation
adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to
declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to
override it.... With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the
adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the
courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal.63
60. E.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
61. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal, Inc., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 539 (1934).
62. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
63. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934).
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This decision represents an important departure from Lochner.6
Moreover, the Supreme Court did not limit its retreat from strict scru-
tiny of state legislation to the due process clause. For example, in an-
other precedent-setting case, Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
Blaisdell, the Court greatly weakened the constraints imposed on state
legislatures by the Contracts Clause.65
Because the precedents of the previous era underpinned the exer-
cise of strong judicial scrutiny of both state and federal regulation, the
juxtaposition of the Court's steadfast fight to maintain limits on the
federal government while abandoning scrutiny of state legislation de-
mands explanation. Oddly, most constitutional treatments use Nebbia
and Blaisdell for dramatic purposes, suggesting that these decisions
heightened the uncertainty about the Court's intentions with respect
to the New Deal.66 Yet the anomalous nature of these decisions re-
mains without explanation.
In the wake of the Great Depression, policy innovations at all
levels of government raised new legal questions about the authority of
legislatures. The number of cases threatened to overwhelm the judi-
cial system, and the Supreme Court in particular. With the number of
federal cases alone, it was unclear whether the Supreme Court had
sufficient resources to fight the New Deal. Given the huge number of
cases generated by the states, attempting to impose its views on the
lower courts in all state and federal issues probably was simply beyond
the Supreme Court's capacity.
Our proposed interpretation of Nebbia is that the Court decided
to abandon substantive due process with respect to the states so that it
could husband its resources for the wore important battle with the
national government. The standard interpretation of Nebbia is that it
simply was one of the first cases that ended the Lochner era.67
64. See, however, Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587 (1936), for a qualification to this
conclusion.
65. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
66. Only William Leuctenberg hints at the problem when he suggests that this was an aber-
ration. See WxUAM E. LEUC ENBERG, THE SuPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUtON IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995).
67. For example, according to Leonard Weiss and Allyn Strickland, the Nebbia decision has
been widely interpreted as stating that states could, in effect, "regulate whatever economic activ-
ity they so desired," and stands as the case that marks "the end of a half-century debate over
what industries could be constitutionally regulated." LEONARD W. WEIss & ALLYN D. STrICK.
LAND, REGULATION: A CASE APPROACH 199 (2d ed. 1982). According to Tribe, Nebbia and
Blaisdell "presaged" the end of Lochner. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL
LAW 450 (1978). David Currie and Robert McCloskey both use Nebbia to heighten the drama
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Nebbia did not necessarily reflect the Supreme Court majority's view
on the appropriate doctrine. Indeed, members of that majority un-
doubtedly preferred the Lochner era's scrutiny. Rather, the Court
abandoned Lochner for strategic reasons-expanding the range of ac-
ceptable lower court decisions so that it could concentrate on the
more important contest with the federal government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to lay out a new approach to think-
ing about the relationship between courts and politics, and for inter-
preting and predicting the effects of electoral politics on the evolution
of judicial doctrine. The point that we wish to emphasize about our
theory is its conceptual approach: that viewing the Supreme Court as
rationally pursuing policy objectives, but taking into account the re-
sponse of political actors and lower courts to the doctrines it proposes,
is a productive way to generate new insights about the behavior of the
judiciary. If nothing else, the theory makes bold predictions that are
falsifiable: hypotheses about the connection between unsettled politics
and doctrinal instability and chaos, the use of lower court appoint-
ments to influence Supreme Court doctrine, and the connections be-
tween legislation relating to the structure of the judiciary and the
power of the Court.
Another important aspect of our work that is very likely to be
misconstrued is its relation to the idealistic view of courts that, while
perilously close to becoming an endangered species in the scholarly
literature, still is alive and well in the law school curriculum. While we
certainly do not believe that this view of judicial decisionmaking con-
stitutes the basis for a complete theory of the courts, our approach is
not totally inconsistent with this view. If judicial decisionmaking is
something of a weighted average between the ideal-type judge and the
judge emphasized in our theory, our model will apply to some but not
all issues. In particular, the appropriate integration of the two ap-
proaches would resemble the theory of low-cost objectivity initially
over the Supreme Court and the New Deal. Currie suggests that, with Nebbia and Blaisdell, "the
Court seemed well on the way to making peace with the modem social state." CURmE, supra
note 59, at 208. McCloskey observes that "[t]he Nebbia decision of 1934 had strongly suggested
an acquiescent judicial temper." McCLosKEY, supra note 2, at 163. Neither attempts to explain
the contrast between these 1934 rulings and those of 1935 and 1936. Our interpretation of
Nebbia is that it represented no change in the fundamental philosophy of the Court, but a strate-
gic decision to fight the New Deal on a different battleground that was politically more visible
than milk regulation in New York.
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propounded by Nobel laureate John Harsanyi.68 In particular, it
would predict that judges ordinarily behave as if they were idealists,
but behave according to our theory with respect to the more heatedly
controversial political issues of the day. We will definitely settle for an
outcome in which our theory works only for the most important
issues.
Obviously, this Article leaves many stones unturned. The core
theoretical model is very simple, and even clearly incorrect in some of
the modeling assumptions that have been made to clarify the exposi-
tion. An obvious item on the unfinished agenda is to add more so-
phistication about the choice of the doctrinal interval and the
Supreme Court's reversionary point when it vacates a lower court de-
cision, and to add more structure to the concept of a political realign-
ment. Likewise, the evidence about appointments, budgets, and case
decisions is no more than suggestive, and certainly far from compre-
hensive. Another unfinished item on the agenda is to be far more
systematic and comprehensive in discussing each of these issues. Fi-
nally, we have modeled only one aspect of judicial doctrine, albeit a
central one.
The intended legacy of this Article is to influence the terms of the
debate about the relationship between politics and the Court. We in-
tend to do additional work on these issues, but our primary hope is
that we have provided a framework for empirical and theoretical work
that others will adopt or even attack. The most important agenda in
this area of research is to develop testable hypotheses that differenti-
ate alternative conceptual models of the evolution of doctrine, and to
do the difficult empirical work necessary to determine where theories
work, and where they do not.
68. John C. Harsanyi, Rational-Choice Models of Political Behavior vs. Functionalist and
Conformist Theories, 21 WoRLD POLITICS 513 (1969).
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APPENDIX
A MODEL OF THE CHOICE OF LEGAL DOCTRINE
A. THE RULES OF THE GAME: THE ORDER OF PLAY
Our model is built around the assumption, borrowed from Linda
Cohen and Matthew Spitzer,6" that the Supreme Court uses legal doc-
trine as a signal to the lower courts about the range of decisions that it
finds acceptable on each issue. Each round of the game has three
stages. In the first stage the Supreme Court chooses its legal doctrine,
given the Court's limitations and opportunities. Lower courts, how-
ever, need not comply with existing legal doctrine. This sets up an
enforcement game between the lower courts and the Supreme Court.
The dynamics of this enforcement game, and the way its equilibrium
shifts with changing parameters, drive the determination of legal
doctrine.
The enforcement game is captured by the next two stages in our
model. In the second stage, the lower courts make decisions on each
case brought before them. In the third stage, the Supreme Court
chooses which lower court decisions to review, if any, subject to its
limitations and opportunities. If the Supreme Court reviews a lower
court's decision, and finds it to be out of compliance with the stated
doctrine, then the Supreme Court replaces the lower court's decision
with its own decision; if not, the lower court's decision stands. At the
end of the third stage the players receive their payoffs for this round
of play. The choices by all of the players determine the final outcomes
of the cases. These outcomes determine the payoffs to the players, as
each player receives a benefit determined by the difference between
the player's preferred outcome and the actual outcome of the case.
1. The Players' Actions
As is the norm in models of policy choice, we adopt a spatial ap-
proach to modeling decisionmaking.70 Issues are represented by
dimensions in a policy space. We assume that courts make decisions
on K types of cases, K > 1. We assume further that courts make deci-
sions one dimension at a time and cannot link their decisions across
69. Cohen & Spitzer, supra note 6, at 65.
70. See generally JAMES M. ENELOW &N MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOT-
ING: AN INTRODUCTION (1984). For models of the courts see Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 6;
Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions,
With Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L ECON. & ORGANIZATION 263
(1990).
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different types of cases. Each decision by the lower courts in stage
two is the choice of a point from a bounded set [0,1] on one of the K
dimensions. If we let Nk be the number of cases to be decided on
dimension k, then lower court i's (0 <_ i < Nk) decision in a case ,of type
k (0 < k < K) is denoted Dik.7 1 The number of dimensions and the
number of 'cases on each dimension are determined exogenously,
prior to the play of the first round.
The Supreme Court makes different types of decisions in the first
and third stages of play. Decisions in the first stage involve choosing a
doctrine, denoted rk, for each of the K types of cases that lower courts
will decide upon in the next stage. The choice of doctrine involves a
statement by the Supreme Court about the range of lower court deci-
sions that it finds acceptable on each of the K dimensions. This range
determines an interval about the Supreme Court's ideal point Sk of
acceptable lower court decisions, that is, [Sk - rk, Sk + rk].
In the third stage, then, the Supreme Court chooses how many
lower court decisions to review on each dimension, denoted Rk We
assume, however, that reviewing lower court decisions is costly. Spe-
cifically, we assume there is a cost Cik to review each case i on each
dimension k. We further assume that the Supreme Court has a con-
strained budget for reviewing lower court decisions. A consequence
of this is that it cannot review every decision on every dimension. We
denote the Supreme Court's budget in stage three as B.
2. The Players' Payoffs
To define the players' payoffs, we assume that each court has an
ideal point, or outcome, on each dimension of its jurisdiction. We de-
note lower court ideal points as Lik The payoff a court receives from
deciding a case is inversely related to the difference between the final
outcome, denoted F, for each case and the court's own ideal point on
the dimension from which the case was drawn, I Lk - Fik I for lower
courts, or I Sk- E kI for the Supreme Court. Each court also has pref-
erences over the types of cases it must decide defined as a set of
weights (Wk for the lower courts and Wk for the Supreme Court) for
each dimension of choice. A court's total payoff is the weighted sum
of Euclidean distances between its own ideal point on each dimension
and the final outcome for each case (in other words, Zkk-lnl-= Wk ISk -
71. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume that each court, 1, 2 .... Nk,
decides a single case on each dimension, k=1, 2,.. K.
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FikI for the Supreme Court and Zk_ W I Lik, - Fk I for each lower
court i).
3. The Players' Knowledge
Before we evaluate the play of the game, its equilibrium, and our
results, we need to discuss what the players know and when they know
it. The players have common knowledge about the rules of the game,
the actions available to each player, and the structure of payoffs and
costs for each player.72 The lower courts, however, possess some pri-
vate information in that they alone know their own ideal point on each
dimension. Thus, while we assume that the Supreme Court knows its
own ideal point on each dimension, it does not know the ideal points
of any of the lower courts.
What the Supreme Court knows at each stage is very important
to determining the equilibrium strategies used by each player. It is
our assumption that the Supreme Court cannot know what a lower
court's decision was in a particular case until it pays the costs of actu-
ally reviewing it. But, of course, the Supreme Court has beliefs about
what sorts of decisions will emanate from the lower courts. These be-
liefs are derived from a set of commonly held beliefs about the distri-
bution of lower court ideal points on each dimension, denoted Ok.
Importantly, this implies that when picking a particular case to review
in the third stage, the Supreme Court does not actually know the loca-
tion of a lower court's decision until after it pays the cost to review it.
We also assume that the Supreme Court knows, or can costlessly
learn, whether or not a decision Dik is in compliance with Sk ± rk. That
is, the Supreme Court does not know the exact location of a lower
court decision but it does know whether or not the decision complies.
This knowledge may result from the appeals process or other forms of
fire alarms.73 It follows that the cases the Supreme Court chooses to
review in stage three are drawn randomly from the set of noncomply-
ing decisions on each dimension.
72. Lower courts have asymmetric knowledge about their own ideal points Lk, but the
Supreme Court's ideal point Sk, and the weights Wk, that the Supreme Court attaches to each of
the k dimensions are common knowledge. Further, the costs that the Supreme Court must pay to
review a case on each dimension, Ca, the Supreme Court's total budget for reviewing lower
court decisions, B, as well as the existing doctrine, rk, are commonly known.
73. Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Learning From Oversight Fire Alarms and
Police Patrols Reconstructed, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 96 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins
& Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28
AM. J. Pot. Sci. 165 (1984).
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Given its choice of doctrine and its knowledge of the distribution
of lower court ideal points, the Supreme Court can calculate the ex-
pected value of reviewing a noncomplying case on dimension k, de-
noted Ek = f I Sk - k I dEkINCk, where the range of integration is over
the portion of Ok, where the Supreme Court expects lower courts not
to comply with stated doctrine, and where NCk is the expected
number of noncomplying decisions on issue k.
The Supreme Court can also calculate the average cost of review-
ing cases on each dimension k; this is Ck = ZCiklNk We further as-
sume that Ck is a decreasing function of rk, This assumption is meant
to capture the as yet unmodeled reaction of lower courts to the extent
of the Supreme Court's doctrine.
It follows from these assumptions that each lower court is also
uncertain about the choices the other lower courts will make during
the second stage of the game. Like the Supreme Court, the lower
courts only know the number of lower courts in compliance and non-
compliance. It follows as well that when Nk is large, lower courts, in-
dividually, are "price takers"; that is, a lone lower court cannot affect
the actions of the other lower courts.
B. THE PLAY OF THE GAME
We will analyze the game described above using the technique of
backward induction. Backward induction ensures that the strategy
combination that results will be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Thus,
we begin by analyzing the third stage first.
1. The Third Stage: The Supreme Court's Reviewing Strategy
In the third stage the Supreme Court chooses its reviewing ac-
tions. The Supreme Court picks a set of reviewing actions, [RI, R2,...,
RK], given its reviewing strategy. With the information it has, the
Supreme Court attempts to maximize the following:
K
I WkRkEk (1)
This maximization is subject to the budget constraint (YlkRkCk -
B) such that the sum of the costs of review must not exceed the
Supreme Court's budget. Thus we get the following Lagrangian:
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K K
= , WRkEk- X (B-( RkCk) (2)
The first order condition for a constrained maximum, a."@Rk= 0 is
WkEk +% XCk = 0 (3)
We can therefore characterize the optimal reviewing strategy for
the Supreme Court as follows: first, rank order WkEk + X Ck for all k.
This yields the per unit marginal expected net payoff of reviewing a
case on each dimension. Review all, or as many as the Supreme
Court's budget will allow, of the cases of the highest-ranked set (the
set with the highest-ranked marginal payoff). If the Supreme Court
has not exhausted its budget, it can then move on to the next highest-
ranked set, and so on until its budget is exhausted.
The strategy just described, however, may produce several action
sets that solve the Supreme Court's constrained maximization prob-
lem. Thus, as is typical in spatial models, we must add a tie-breaking
assumption so that we can identify a unique maximum to the Supreme
Court's problem at stage three. Assume first, without loss of general-
ity, that the dimensions are ordered so that the dimensions the Court
accords the lowest weight, Wk, are given the lowest number from 1 to
K (if two or more dimensions have the same weight, then the ties are
broken randomly). Second, and more restrictive, among optimal
strategies, the Court picks the one where the sum of the dimensional
rankings is greatest.
What all this implies is that the Supreme Court not only picks
those cases to review that yield the highest expected marginal net pay-
off, but, if there are ties among the choices, then it chooses the dimen-
sions it cares the most about (where Wk is the greatest). Having
defined a tie-breaking rule for the Supreme Court, it is now clear that
the above described strategy will always yield a unique optimal choice
among Rk in the third stage.
2. The Second Stage
Each lower court, by its choice of Dib tries to minimize the
following:
K
I WJkIFik- Likj (4)
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Notice, Fik is either Di, if the case is not reviewed by the Supreme
Court in stage three, or it is Sk, if it is reviewed. Given what each
lower court knows, it can predict Rk for each dimension.
What sorts of actions will the lower courts adopt? Since the lower
courts' decisions on each dimension are separable, we can examine
their strategy one dimension at a time. It turns out that the lower
courts will either stick with their ideal points in deciding their cases (in
other words, Dj = Lk), or they will switch to the point in the range [Sk
- rb Sk + rk] closest to Lk. No other actions can make the lower
courts better off. To see this, consider the following: If a lower court's
ideal point is such that Lik e [Sk - rb Sk + rk], then the court has no
reason to choose any point but its ideal for its decision Di, If Lik < Sk
- rA, for example, then court i will stick if and only if:
Rk/NCk IL -Sk I I Lk-Sk + rk 1, (5)
otherwise it will switch. That is, court i will stick when the difference
between sticking and switching is greater than the expected value of
being reviewed and overturned. We can of course identify the same
inequality for lower courts such that Lik > Sk + rk. The strategy de-
fined by the above inequality yields a unique decision, stick or switch,
for lower courts. The above strategy was designed to be optimal, on
each dimension, for each lower court.
An important lemma that follows from the above inequality is
that, on any dimension k, for any given set of parameters and any
chosen doctrine, there will exist a tipping point for lower courts with
ideal points Lik < Sk - rk, such that all lower courts with ideal points
Lik < TLk (where TLk denotes the lower tipping point) will have a
dominant strategy to stick in stage two (Di = Lik), and all lower courts
with ideal points Lik > TLk will have a dominant strategy to switch (Dik
= Sk - rk). The proof of this lemma can be seen by construction. Pick
any set of parameters for the lower courts' decision problem. There
will exist some lower courts for whom it is preferable to stick (whose
ideal points are far enough distant from Sk - rk so that the above ine-
quality points to sticking) and for whom it is preferable to switch
(where the reverse is true). It is possible fot the tipping point to be
outside of [0, 1], in which case all lower courts either stick or switch. A
similar proof can be given for the existence of an upper tipping point,
TUl
Our first proposition follows from this lemma. The proposition
has two parts.
1680
POSITIVE THEORY OF JUDICIAL DOCTRINE
Proposition 1. (1)Lower court compliance with legal doctrine results
not from a preference for stability or an adherence to a norm; rather,
it results from the Supreme Court's threat to enforce the doctrine.
When the Supreme Court punishes lower courts, the punishment
meted out is not a loss of prestige or reputation; rather, the punish-
ment consists of the loss in utility to the lower courts from the substi-
tution of the lower court's decision with the Supreme Court's ideal
point. (2) The greater the resources the Supreme Court possesses, on
a dimension of choice, relative to the number of cases it must review,
the greater the number of lower courts on that dimension who will
choose to switch to, and thereby comply with, legal doctrine.
3. The First Stage
Finally, at the first stage of the game, the Supreme Court must
pick a doctrinal interval [Sk - rk, Sk + rk]. Thus, looking ahead the
Supreme Court is able to choose a doctrinal strategy [ri, r2,..., rk] so
that it can minimize the following:
K Nk
I, I ,w I Fk- SkI (6)
The optimal strategy at stage one is thus to pick a doctrine on
each dimension that induces lower court responses at stage two, and a
reviewing strategy at stage three, that yield the highest utility. This
sets up a large linear programming problem over the choice of doc-
trine. The problem, however, is that the Supreme Court has incom-
plete and uncertain information relative to its decisions.
We can see how the Supreme Court solves this programming
problem. On each dimension k it has beliefs Ok about the distribution
of lower court ideal points. Further, for any choice of rA, the Supreme
Court can use Ok to calculate the tipping points, TUk and TLk. This
implies that, for any rk and any set of beliefs Ok the Supreme Court
can estimate NCk and E, Thus, the Supreme Court can anticipate the
ranking it will come up with at stage three, and ultimately, the payoffs
it will receive at the end of the round. Since there exists a unique
response by the lower courts and, in stage three, by the Supreme
Court, to any choice of doctrine, we know each choice of doctrine at
stage one yields a unique payoff. With this information, the Supreme
Court is able to calculate a doctrinal strategy rA, so as to find a unique
minimum for equation (6). That is, there exists a unique doctrinal
1995] 1681
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:1631
strategy for each dimension such as it maximizes the Supreme Court's
payoff.
74
Thus, we have shown that there is a unique optimizing strategy
for every player at every stage in the game. Proposition 2 follows:
Proposition2. There exists a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium for
each play of the game.
C. COMPARATIVE STATICS
We can now derive our main propositions concerning predictions
of doctrinal change. This result is based on changes in the areas (de-
fined over [0,1]) of the above defined terms. The specific integrals
follow straightforwardly from our result.
We are concerned with how changes in the number of noncom-
plying cases, NCb on a dimension lead to a change in legal doctrine,
rk 75 First, notice that an increase (decrease) in NCk is equivalent to a
decrease (increase) in the Supreme Court's budget. For example, if
the current budget allows the Court to review ten cases and there exist
ten noncomplying cases, the Court can review all of the cases. If the
Court's budget decreases such that the Court can only review five
cases, then it will only review half of the cases. Equivalently, if, in-
stead, the number of noncomplying cases doubles to twenty (and the
budget stays constant), then the Court can only review half of the
cases. Thus, the effect of a change in budget on the change in doctrine
(and on the other choice variables) is equivalent to the impact on doc-
trine of a change in NCk. That is a {equilibrium}/ONCk = a {equilib-
rium}/B where {equilibrium} includes all of the choice variables, rk,
Dik, and Rk.
As we have discussed, an increase in the budget allows the
Supreme Court to review more cases. Thus, a Rkla B >_ 0. As more
cases are reviewed (because of an increased budget), the lower courts'
expected value of sticking decreases, and thus more lower courts will
74. Note that that the Supreme Court will not always, if ever, set rk = 0, as we have as-
sumed that Ck, the average cost of reviewing a case on dimension k, is a decreasing function of rk.
Thus, setting rk = 0 would lead to very costly reviews.
75. By assumption, the Court knows whether a decision by a lower court complies with its
doctrines, and within the context of the model this assumption implies that the Court only re-
views noncomplying decisions. We do not quarrel with the view that in some cases, especially
when the precedents of district courts conflict, the Supreme Court will pick a complying case
when it decides to resolve the dispute; however, for ease of exposition we have set forth a model
that is too simple to accommodate this kind of behavior.
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switch. This leads to 8D,/ORk 0 for L, < Sk and ODiJaR 0 for L, >
Sk. This gives DIjkB > 0 for Lik < Sk and Dik/aB < 0 for L& > Sk.
Thus, as the number of cases reviewed by the Court, Rk, in-
creases, the lower court decisions, Dik, will move closer to the
Supreme Court's ideal, Sk. This results in more complying lower
courts which in turn increases the probability of review for the re-
maining noncomplying lower courts. This leads to an increased incen-
tive to switch; that is, more lower courts will switch, implying that
aTLk/aB 0 and aTUk8B 0 0. As the tipping points collapse toward
the Supreme Court's ideal, the Court will pull the doctrine closer to its
ideal in order to maximize the value of the switchers, so that ark/aTLk
< 0 and arklaTUk 0.
From this, we know that ork/OB = (arkaTLk) (aTLkOB). Both
of these functions are differentiable and we have shown that (orki
aTLk) is negative and (aTLk/aB) is positive. This gives ark/OB 0 . In
words, this implies that as the budget increases (decreases), the judi-
cial doctrine will decrease (increase). As explained, this is equivalent
to showing an increase in the number of noncomplying cases, NCk,
leads to an expanding judicial doctrine (orklaNCk) 0). Proposition 3,
4, and 5 follow straightforwardly from this logic.
Proposition 3. An increase in lower court cases on dimension k, all
else constant, causes: (1) the Supreme Court to expand the doctrinal
interval around its ideal point on dimension k; (2) the Supreme Court
to skip choosing doctrine on dimension k or some other dimen-
sion(s); or (3) no change in doctrine or enforcement of doctrine.
Proposition 4. An increase in C all else constant, causes: (1) a de-
crease in enforcement on dimension k or some other dimension; (2) a
change in doctrine on dimension k or some other dimension(s),
where doctrine on dimension k is changed to be farther from Sk than
previously; or (3) no change in enforcement or doctrine.
Proposition 5. A decrease in Wk all else constant, causes: (1) a de-
crease in enforcement on dimension k or some other dimension(s);
(2) a change in doctrine on dimension k or some other dimension,
where doctrine on dimension k, if changed, is farther from Sk, or (3)
no change in enforcement or doctrine.
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